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Abstract 
Although China's real estate market (CREM) has made great development since the Chinese government adopted the 
reform and opening-up policy in 1978, it has been confronted with many problems during this period. This paper 
describes the background of CREM and its basic situation, outlines its main problems, and presents suggestions for 
its sustainable development. 
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1. Introduction 
China has made significant progress in economic growth since the Chinese government adopted the 
“reform and opening-up” policy in 1978, which is reflected partially by CREM’s rapid development from 
1978 to present. Nevertheless, with housing prices rocketing in China in recent years, a growing number 
of scholars, officials and common Chinese people are paying special attention to and putting forward their 
views or suggestions on the sustainability of CREM since it is related to the immediate interests of every 
person living in China. 
2. The Background and Basic Status of CREM 
The socialist public ownership of land was established since the foundation of the People's Republic of 
China (PRC) on October 1st 1949. The Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, amended in 2004, 
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still stated that “no organization or individual may appropriate, buy, sell or lease land, or unlawfully 
transfer land in other ways” [1]. The basic condition of CREM from 1949 to 1978 was that private 
ownership of land was eliminated, that land supply totally relied on administrative allocation, and that 
urban housing was completely non-commercial. CREM began to recover gradually since 1978 and the 
Chinese government subsequently introduced a number of related laws and regulations. 
The constitutional amendment adopted by the National People's Congress (NPC) in 1988 explicitly 
stated that “the right to the use of land may be transferred according to law” [2]. This amendment 
symbolized a historic change in China's land-use institution, leading to a jump in the quality and quantity 
of the real estate-related laws and regulations introduced subsequently. For example, the State Council of 
the PRC promulgated The Interim Regulations of the People's Republic of China concerning the 
Assignment and Transfer of the Right to the Use of the State-Owned Land in the Urban Areas on May 
19th, 1990 [3]. The Ministry of Construction of the PRC promulgated The Planning and Administrations 
Measures concerning the Assignment and Transfer of the Right to the Use of the State-Owned Land in the 
Urban Areas on December 4th, 1992 [4]. The introduction of these laws allowed CREM to develop. 
Nevertheless, a real estate bubble appeared quickly in Southern China, such as Hainan and Shenzhen, for 
the first time since the foundation of the PRC. The Chinese government began the first round of 
tightening macro-control. The burst of this real estate bubble led to a considerable amount of unfinished 
properties and bank bad debts. 
The Law of the People’s Republic of China on Administration of the Urban Real Estate was adopted 
by the National People's Congress of the PRC in 1994 [5], and it went into force as of January 1st, 1995. 
This law was rigorous from a system perspective since it covered real estate development, real estate 
transactions, administration of real estate ownership registration, legal liability and other aspects. Its 
implementation signified that CREM officially entered a stage of the legalization. After this law, the 
relevant departments of the Chinese government introduced a large number of CREM laws and 
regulations. It can be said that the Chinese government is gradually improving the system of laws and 
regulations fitting CREM’s development. 
The People's Bank of China promulgated The Measures for the Administration of Individual Housing 
Loans in 1998 [6]. The regulation provided that individual housing loans may be used for the purchase of 
all ordinary housing for personal use, that individual housing loans could be issued in all the cities and 
towns of China , and that all banks in China could conduct the business of individual housing loans. The 
implementation of this policy directly stimulated the growth of housing loans and CREM. According to 
the data published by the National Bureau of Statistics of China, China's actual housing sales in 1987 was 
11 billion RMBs with 26,972,400 square meters while that in 1998 was 251.3 billion RMBs with 
121,853,300 square meters [7]. 
The State Council of the PRC issued The Notice of the State Council of the PRC on Strengthening the 
Administration of State-Owned Land in 2001 [8]. This notice proposed to strictly control the total supply 
of land for construction, to strictly enforce the principle of paid use of state-owned land, and to improve 
the administration of the transfer of the right to the use of land, and to regulate the administrative 
approval of land development plans. This notice emphasized that great efforts should be made to promote 
the transfer of the right to the use of land via biddings and auctions so as to reflect the principle of market 
economy and to ensure open, fair and impartial transactions of the right to the use of land. 
The State Council of the PRC issued The Notice of the State Council of the PRC on Enhancing the 
Sustainable and Healthy Development of Real Estate in 2003 [9]. This notice proposed on the level of the 
central government for the first time that the real estate industry was highly associated with and could 
exert strong driving forces to other industries of the national economy, and that it had become a pillar 
industry of the national economy. This notice also emphasized that keeping the sustained and healthy 
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development of CREM was of great significance for building a moderately prosperous society and 
accelerating the socialist modernization. This notice once again stimulated CREM’s development. 
Rocketing housing prices in China attracted the attention of the Chinese government around 2005. The 
State Council of the PRC issued a series of notices and suggestions during this period, such as Notice of 
the State Council of the PRC on Effectively Stabilizing Housing Prices, Notice of the Ministry of 
Construction and other Departments of the PRC Forwarded by the State Council of the PRC on Doing 
Good Job in Stabilizing Housing Prices, and Suggestions of the State Council of the PRC on Adjusting 
Housing Supply Structure and Stabilizing Housing Prices. The main purpose of these documents was that 
the local governments should take effective measures to curb the excessive rising of the housing prices in 
China. The laws and regulations issued later mainly focused on improving and enhancing the oversight 
and regulation of CREM. According to data published by the National Bureau of Statistics of China, the 
real estate sales in China reached sales 4.4355 trillion RMBs with 947.55 million square meters [10]. 
3. Main Problems in CREM 
Although many problems occur in CREM’s rapid development, only the most important two are 
discussed due to limited space. 
3.1. Housing prices 
According to Report on the Housing Prices of One Hundred Cities from China Real Estate Index 
System in December 2010 published by China Index Academy on January 4th, 2011, the average of 
housing prices in China’s 100 cities was 8564 RMBs per square meter (PSM): Shenzhen ranked NO.1 
with 24,902 RMBs PSM, followed by Shanghai with 23,305 RMBs PSM and Beijing with 22,535 RMBs 
PSM. The report also publicized that the average of housing prices in China’s ten biggest cities, e.g. 
Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, Nanjing, Hangzhou, Guangzhou, Wuhan, Chongqing, Shenzhen and Chengdu, 
was 15,523 RMBs PSM in December 2010 [11]. 
China Index Academy released Housing Price Indexes of World's Top Ten Metropolises in April 2011 
(see Table 1) via the Global Real Estate Index System (GREIS) for the first time on April 23rd, 2011. The 
indexes were calculated based on the list prices of new housing in Hong Kong, Singapore, London, 
Vancouver, New York, San Francisco, Toronto, Los Angeles, Sydney, Melbourne and Brisbane. 
Although  Beijing ranked last among the ten cities in terms of housing price index, the average price of its 
sample housing was 22,893 RMBs PSM, very close to Brisbane's 23,891 RMBs PSM. The indexes also 
showed that the average prices of new housing in Sydney and Melbourne did not exceed 30,000 RMBs 
PSM [12]. 
Although the housing prices in China’s big cities, represented by Beijing, Shanghai and Shenzhen, are 
approached those in big western cities, the income level of ordinary Chinese people is far lower than that 
of developed countries. According to the analytical report, Income of Urban Residents Continued to 
Increase, and Income of Low- and Middle-income Groups Rose Faster in 2010 announced by the 
National Bureau of Statistics of China in March 2011, the disposable income of urban residents was 
19,109 RMBs in 2010, with Beijing's disposable income per capita 29,073 RMB and Shanghai’s 
disposable income per capita 31,838 RMBs [13]. According to Per Capita Personal Income by State 
complied by the Bureau of Business and Economic Research (BBER) of the University of New Mexico 
on the basis of data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis of the U.S. Dept. of Commerce, the per capita 
personal income of New York was 48,821 U.S Dollars in 2010 [14], namely 330,494 RMBs calculated 
with the average of the central parity rate of the RMB against the U.S. dollar at 6.7695. 
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It can be seen from comparing the housing prices and per capita personal incomes of Beijing and New 
York that the per capita personal income of New York in 2010 can buy 7.65 square meters of new local 
housing in 2010 while that of Beijing could only buy 1.27 square meters of new housing at Beijing. 
According to the data, if a common Beijing resident plans to buy a one hundred-square-meter property in 
Beijing, he or she has to work for 79 years continuously without any other additional expenses to pay off 
the property. Nevertheless, a common New York resident only needs work for 13 years continuously so 
as to pay off a local hundred-square-meter property. If the calculation takes families rather than 
individuals as units, a common couple in Beijing has to work for 39 years continuously without any other 
additional expenses to pay off the property while a common couple in New York only needs to work for 
6.5 years continuously without any other additional expenses to pay off the local property. It can be 
concluded from above analysis that housing at Beijing has gone beyond the affordability of ordinary local 
people. So is the case in other cities of China. It can be inferred with sound reasons that the Chinese 
government must pay close attention to the problem of high housing-prices and take measures to avoid a 
real estate bubble if CREM is to develop sustainably. Actually, the data above has sent out a dangerous 
signal. 
Table 1. Housing Price Indexes of World's Top Ten Metropolises in April 2011 
Note: The housing price indices were calculated based on the annual weighted average of the housing prices of Beijing in 2010, 
namely 1000 points.  
 
Average unit price 
of housing 
samples 
Average unit 
price of housing 
samples 
Average total 
price of housing 
samples 
Average total 
price of housing 
samples 
Ranking Cities 
in local currencies 
and measurement 
units 
(RMB/m2) in local currencies (RMB) 
Housing Price 
Index 
(NOTE) 
1 Hong Kong 115,738 HKD/m
2 97,486 19,029,557 HKD 16,028,596 4,406 
2 Singapore 1,568 SGD/sq.ft 87,744 4,693,017 SGD 24,395,241 3,966 
3 London 605 GBP/sq.ft 68,736 1,062,623 GBP 11,214,387 3,107 
4 Vancouver 627 CAD/sq.ft 45,549 1,643,522 CAD 11,096,732 2,059 
5 New York 612 USD/sq.ft 43,175 1,138,387 USD 7,463,719 1,951 
6 San Francisco 568 USD/sq.ft 40,099 716,924 USD 4,700,441 1,812 
7 Toronto 522 CAD/sq.ft 37,924 963,601 CAD 6,506,044 1,714 
8 Los Angeles 497 USD/sq.ft 35,066 1,006,783 USD 6,600,873 1,585 
9 Sydney 4,416 AUD/m2 29,921 781,129 AUD 5,292,386 1,352 
10 Melbourne 4,033 AUD/m2 27,324 700,672 AUD 4,747,260 1,235 
11 Brisbane 3,526 AUD/m2 23,891 518,203 AUD 3,510,981 1,080 
12 Beijing 22,893 RMB/m2 22,893 2,485,148 RMB 2,485,148 1,035 
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3.2. Land transfer mechanism  
Apart from soaring housing prices, land prices in CREM are anther focus of attention. Land supply in 
China is completely monopolized by the Chinese government. The dominant method for land transfer is 
auction, which is supplemented by administrative allocation. Although the rise in land prices will not 
necessarily lead to increase in housing prices because housing prices are determined by various market 
factors, such as supply and demand, it should be noted that the Chinese government is able to control land 
prices in China via adjusting land supply since it has been monopolizing the land supply in China, and 
that the rise in land prices of CREM is difficult to avoid, if not inevitable, due to the current fierce 
competition among land demanders. At the same time, the huge land demand emerged in China’s massive 
urbanization also causes increase in land prices and thus in housing prices. 
The data from Land-Transfer Revenue Soared, Good New from Wars on Urban Land Transfer in 2010 
published by China Index Academy in January 2011 (see Table 2) shows that: the average transaction 
price of residential land in Beijing was 7357 RMBs PSM in 2010, increased by 29% compared with 2009; 
the average in Nanjing where the biggest increase occurred was 5454 RMBs PSM, increased by 63% 
compared with 2009; Shanghai was the only area where the average price fell from 7944 RMBs PSM in 
2009 to 6632 RMBs PSM in 2010, a decrease of 17% [15]. 
Table 2. Transacted areas of and average land prices per floor area of residential land for China’s top 10 cities in land-transfer 
revenue 
Transacted area of residential land  
(10000 m2) 
Average land prices per floor area for 
residential land (RMB/m2) 
Cities 
2010 2009 Year-on-year growth 2010 2009 
Year-on-year 
growth 
Beijing 760 625 22% 7357 5724 29% 
Shanghai 977 612 60% 6632 7944 -17% 
Dalian 2271 728 212% 2054 1736 18% 
Tianjin 2372 2177 9% 1884 1251 51% 
Wuhan 1367 1232 11% 1751 1173 49% 
Hangzhou 375 609 -38% 6597 6331 4% 
Nanjing 352 297 19% 5454 3336 63% 
Chengdu 742 686 8% 1787 1543 16% 
Chongqing 1062 782 36% 1630 1668 -2% 
Wuxi 605 305 98% 2860 2511 14% 
 
In addition, the local governments can acquire the most of land transfer revenue and no longer turn 
them over to the central government since the tax reform in 1994. Land transfer revenues have become 
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the main income source of the local governments of many cities in China due to the dramatic 
development of CREM. In this case, it is difficult to curb the impulses of the local governments to 
transfer land for money, which is exemplified by Beijing. An announcement published by Beijing 
Municipal Finance Bureau in January 2011 shows that the revenue of the People’s Government of Beijing 
was 235.39 billion RMBs [16]. The data from Land-Transfer Revenue Soared, Good New from the Wars 
on Urban Land Transfer in 2010 published by China Index Academy in January 2011 (see Table 3) 
shows that the land-transfer revenue of Beijing was 162.854 billion RMBs in 2010, a rise of 75.5% 
compared with 92.779 billion RMBs in 2009 [17]. It can be calculated that land-transfer revenue 
accounted for 69% of the income of the People’s Government of Beijing in 2010. 
Table 3. Ranking of China's Big Cities by Land-Transfer Revenue in 2010 
Ranking Cities Land-transfer revenue in 2010 
Land-transfer 
revenue in 2009
Year-on-year 
growth 
1 Beijing 1628.54 927.79 75.50% 
2 Shanghai 1513.43 1025.29 47.60% 
3 Dalian 1157.75 275.29 320.60% 
4 Tianjin 901.23 739.13 21.90% 
5 Wuhan 812.55 360.70 125.30% 
6 Hangzhou 738.10 1094.95 -32.60% 
7 Nanjing 572.02 224.25 155.10% 
8 Chengdu 510.61 356.45 43.30% 
9 Chongqing 506.68 448.47 13.00% 
10 Wuxi 411.50 220.70 86.50% 
 
4. Suggestions for the Sustainable Development of CREM 
Suggestions for keeping CREM developing sustainably and healthily are presented for CREM’s main 
problems mentioned previously. 
4.1. The investment demand for housing should be curbed effectively. 
Generally, the increase expectation of housing prices is one of the key factors influencing the 
investment demand for housing. According to an announcement by the Monetary Policy Department of 
the People's Bank of China in April 2011, the interest rate for three-year term deposit is 4.75% while the 
interest rate for five-year term deposit is 5.25% [18]. Nevertheless, the consumer price index has a gain of 
5.3% [19] nationwide during the same period according to the National Bureau of Statistics of China. In 
this case, a considerable number of housing investors will choose to put their money into the housing 
market to make a profit if the increase expectation of housing prices is higher than these figures 
mentioned above. Meanwhile, common Chinese people may invest their money in the housing market to 
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resist inflation since they merely have a narrow access to investment channels. These kinds of investment 
may further boost housing prices in China. 
In addition, if one uses a loan to pay off an apartment, and the total of the rent from the apartment and 
the net profit from buying and selling the apartment exceeds the interest of the loan, investment in 
housing is profitable. This chance of making money also causes some investment demand for housing, 
thus moving housing prices up. 
Therefore, we suggest that the Chinese government first contain the rise of the consumer price index, 
increase the deposit and lending rates in China by proper values at the right time in accordance China’s 
economic development, and introduce relevant policies and regulations to drop common Chinese people’s 
expectation on the increase of housing prices, thus effectively curbing the investment demand for housing. 
4.2. The practical affordability of local people should be considered in setting the control objectives for 
the housing price of a place. 
Housing prices are not expected to decrease as possible since excessively low housing prices or a too-
rapid decline in housing prices will also bring about tough problems. Nevertheless, the Chinese 
governments must consider the practical affordability of local people when they lay out long-term control 
goals of housing prices. As mentioned earlier, a common couple in Beijing has to work for 39 years 
continuously without any other additional expenses to pay off an one-hundred-square-meter property, 
which is definitely beyond the scope of reason. In addition, it should be noted that different income 
groups differ in their demands for properties. Therefore, we hold that the Chinese governments should 
increase the supply of the kind of housing demanded by middle- and low-income groups via 
administrative or fiscal means and that it can allow the high prices of properties intended for high-income 
groups. 
4.3. The supply of land for urban construction should be expanded on the precondition of ensuring a 
proper area of cultivated land. 
The Chinese government monopolizes land supply under the current land transfer mechanism. The 
government first acquires urban construction land via various ways of land expropriation and transfer the 
right to the use of the land via primary market transactions to organizations or individuals demanding 
land. The methods of transferring land mainly include auction and administrative allocation. Most land 
demanders have to obtain land via bidding in auction since administrative allocation rarely involves 
market factors. Theoretically, the government can regulate land prices and thus affect housing prices by 
adjusting land supply, though the regulation and influence depends on the degree of competition among 
land demanders. In light of the current situation of CREM, if the Chinese government is to maintain the 
sustainable and healthy development of CREM, it must increase the supply of land for urban construction 
and speed up the construction of supporting municipal facilities including transportation. The local 
governments should ensure that land supply meet the land demand of growing urban populations. 
4.4. The dependence of the local governments on land-transfer revenues should be cut. 
The auction-dominated approach to land transfer can allow the relevant departments of the local 
governments to significantly increase the operational efficiency and profitability of land. China's current 
land transfer mechanism allow the governments to gain the 70 years rent of the transferred land for one 
time, which means that the local governments can obtain a large amount of money in a short time via land 
transactions. As discussed previously, land-transfer revenues have become the major income source for 
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many local governments in China. Nonetheless, the problem is that land prices will continue to rise due to 
fierce competition among housing buyers. Maximum economic gains have become the primary goal of 
the local governments’ transferring land because of their heavy dependence land-transfer revenues.  
In this case, we suggest that the land-transfer revenue gathered by the local governments should be 
administered strictly, that the share of the revenue submitted to the central government should be 
increased, and that the use of the rest of the revenue should be specified in detail and supervised with 
toughness. For example, the central government can order that a certain proportion of the land-transfer 
revenue acquired the local government must be used for housing development programs intended for low-
income groups, and this amount of money should be subject to rigorous audit. The main purpose of this 
suggestion is to curtail the local governments’ discretionary power on land-transfer revenues and to check 
their impulses to transfer land merely for making money. 
5. Conclusion 
CREM began to recover gradually since the Chinese government adopted the policy of reform and 
opening up in 1978, in the subsequent 30 years of which the Chinese government promulgated a series of 
laws and regulations concerning CREM. According to the data published by the National Bureau of 
Statistics of China, the sales of China’s commercial housing reached 4.4355 trillion RMBs with 947.55 
million square meters in 2009. Housing prices and land transfer mechanism are the two most important 
problems emerged in the rapid expansion of CREM. Specifically, housing prices in China are too high 
compared with the disposable incomes of the Chinese people. There is a big demand on reforming the 
current land transfer mechanism. In order to maintain the sustainability of CREM, we propose to the 
Chinese Government: (1) to effectively depress the investment demand for housing; (2) to take account of 
the affordability of the local people in setting the control objectives of the housing price of a place; (3) to 
increase the supply of land for urban construction on the condition of ensuring the area of cultivated land; 
(4) to cut the dependence of the local governments on land-transfer revenues. 
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